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2European Climate - Energy Security Nexus: a 
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In this research, we have provided an overview of the climate-security nexus in 
the European sector through a model based scenario analysis with POLES 
model. The analysis underline that under stringent climate policies, Europe take 
advantage of a double dividend in its capacity to develop a new cleaner energy 
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It is usually considered that the development of national or regional energy 
policies should be based on three pillars: energy security, environmental 
sustainability and economic competitiveness. This is particularly true for 
Europe, where each one of these pillars is brought forward by one 
dedicated institution, respectively the Directorates General for Energy and 
Transport, for Environment and for Competition. But this is also true for 
other countries or regions of the world, as the development of sound 
energy policies is often considered as based on trade-offs, aiming at the 
right balance between potentially conflicting goals. The key argument of 
this paper is to demonstrate that these targets may be put into 
convergence, according to the policy hypotheses retained at the global 
and regional level. In particular, the adoption and implementation of strong 
climate change and emission reduction policies may be considered as the 
most effective way to enhance energy security through a lower degree of 
dependence of the European energy system on fossil fuels. 
  In order to explore this “energy security and climate policy nexus”, 
we use the POLES world energy model. In line with former energy 
foresight exercises performed at European and world level with this model, 
we describe a family of scenarios based on consistent sets of exogenous 
hypotheses on economic growth, energy resources, technology 
performances and climate policies. The POLES model is not a General 








































2Equilibrium Model, but a Partial Equilibrium Model aimed at describing the 
energy sector, within a year by year dynamic recursive simulation 
framework. In this paper, we describe the results of four scenarios in order 
to illustrate the consequences of different settings concerning climate 
policies on the fundamentals of the energy markets, both at global and 
regional level. 
The first one is called Muddling Through and illustrates the consequences 
of relatively low intensity and non-coordinated climate policies in the 
different world regions. This scenario can be used as a reference case, to 
which stronger policy cases can be compared. The second and third 
cases respectively identified as Muddling Through with Europe Plus, and 
Europe goes Alone, describe situations in which Europe implements 
gradually stronger climate policies than in the mere Muddling Through 
case, while the rest of the world sticks to low intensity climate policies. 
Finally, the Global Regime scenario illustrates the consequences of 
coordinated and ambitious climate policy, shared at world level.  
The exercise shows that energy policies in the Muddling Through case 
result in a noticeable limitation of emissions compared to Business As 
Usual case. However the global emission level reached in 2050 far 
exceeds the one that is considered as reasonable in IPCC’s AR4. The 
Europe Alone scenario helps to show that in a world with low policy 
coordination there might still be strong advantages in pursuing an 
ambitious regional climate policy as it may considerably limit the 
vulnerability of Europe to events occurring in an otherwise very unstable 
energy world. The Global Regime case not only helps to constrain climate 








































2change in an acceptable range but also changes the whole picture of the 
world energy system in the first half of the century. In particular, the long 
term sustainability of the oil and gas production profile is significantly 
improved. Two variants are developed for this case: Global Regime with 
two carbon markets (GR-2M) and Global Regime with full trade for carbon 
(GR-FT) in order to test the consequences of a differentiated or a unified 
carbon emissions market. 
Section 1 of this paper briefly presents the POLES model and the 
Muddling Through scenario, which, although it contains some elements of 
emission reduction, represents a state of the world that is maybe probable, 
but surely not desirable from the climate change perspective. Section 2 is 
dedicated to the presentation of the climate policy alternative scenarios 
and to the comparative analysis of their results in terms of emission 
performances and impacts on the world and European energy system to 
2050. Section 3 discusses the consequences for the international energy 
markets and for the energy import profiles of Europe. Section 4 translates 
the conclusions of this study in terms of risks and vulnerability; it also 
points to the double dividend that may be associated with a change in the 
European energy paradigm. 
1.  The POLES model and the Muddling Through projection  
The Muddling Through projection provides an image of the energy scene 
upto 2050, resulting from the continuation of ongoing trends and structural 
changes in the world economy, with only low intensity and non-
coordinated climate policies in the different world regions.  








































2Through the identification of the drivers and constraints in the energy 
system, the model used in this exercise allows the description of the 
pathways for energy development, fuel supply, greenhouse gas 
emissions, international and end-user prices, on a year by year basis from 
today to 2050. The approach combines a high degree of detail in the key 
components of the energy systems and a strong economic consistency, as 
all changes in these key components are largely determined by relative 
price changes at sectoral level. The model identifies 47 regions for the 
world, with 22 energy demand sectors and about 40 energy technologies – 
now including generic “high energy efficiency” end-use technologies. 
Therefore, each scenario can be described as the set of economically 
consistent transformations of the initial Business As Usual projection that 
is induced by the introduction of policy constraints. 
1.1.  The POLES model 
The POLES model is a partial equilibrium model of the world's energy 
system that provides a detailed year-by-year projection until 2050 (or in 
some studies 2100), for the different regions of the world. The model 
simulates the energy demand for each economic sector, the supply and 
prices for the primary energy sources on the international markets, and the 
impacts of innovation, experience effects and R&D in new and renewable 
energy technologies and major energy conversion systems (electricity or 
hydrogen-based for the longer term).  
The model therefore provides a consistent framework for studying the 
interconnected dynamics of energy development and environmental 
impacts. Projections are made on the basis of exogenous economic 








































2growth and demographic projections for each region. It takes into account 
the resource constraints for both oil and natural gas and enables the 
calculation of greenhouse gas emissions from the burning of fossil fuels 
and, further on, of the costs (marginal and total) of reducing emissions in 
the various countries or regions. 
It thus makes possible the simulation of various emission constraint 
scenarios and the identification of the consequences of introducing a 
carbon tax or emission quotas systems. The main limitation of this 
modelling system is probably that it does not account for macro-economic 
feedbacks. However, this also allows the production of a relatively robust 
estimate of the impacts of climate policies on the sole energy sector, while 
the macro impacts are most often taken into account in joint studies with 
other energy economy models such as GEM-E3 (NTUA, Athens) or 
IMACLIM (CIRED, Paris). 
Figure 1: The POLES Model Simulation Process 
International Energy Markets






















































































































Source: POLES model-LEPII 








































21.2.  The Muddling Through projection and the comeback of coal 
The  Muddling Through projection adopts exogenous forecasts for 
population and economic growth in the different world regions. In order to 
take into account the current financial and economic crisis, the latest 
Muddling Through case shows a global GDP growth rate in 2009 that is 
50 percent lower than in the preceding POLES projections, with a catch-up 
to formerly considered growth rates in 2013. This corresponds to a world 
GDP that is in 2015 more than 5  percent lower than considered in 
previous POLES energy outlooks. This might, however, still be considered 
as an optimistic view on the capability of recovery of the world economy in 
the short-medium term. Other hypotheses on world economic growth 
might be explored through alternative runs of the model. 
The projection is based on consistent assumptions on the availability of 
fossil energy resources and on the costs and performances of future 
technologies. In this kind of scenario, a standard discount rate of 8 percent 
is used to simulate investment decisions in the energy sector. Figure 2 
describes the dynamics of the world and European energy system, in the 
initial settings considered in the Muddling Through. 






















































































Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
The key outcome of the Muddling Through case is almost a doubling of 
world energy consumption from 2000 to 2050, with a levelling-off of world 
oil and gas production after 2030. In spite of a significant development in 
nuclear energy, biomass and other renewables, which in 2050 represent 
more than one fourth of world Gross Inland Energy Consumption (GIEC), 
the primary source that most gains in importance is coal, which passes 
from 2.2 Gtoe to 4 Gtoe between 2000 and 2050. One can note that this is 
already much less than in the Business As Usual runs. As for Europe, the 
dynamics in GIEC is much less pronounced with an increase from 
1.7 Gtoe to only 1.9 Gtoe between 2000 and 2050. There again one notes 
a levelling-off of oil and gas consumption, the progress of renewables and 
the penetration of coal, although with a more modest magnitude than at 
world level. 








































21.3.  The probable unsustainability of the Muddling Through: upstream and 
downstream constraints  
In many respects, however, this scenario is hardly sustainable in the long 
term. First of all, the level of oil production is high, peaking at slightly less 
than 100 Mbd in 2030 for conventional oil (Figure 3). This is a high level, 
which implies very high levels of total cumulative conventional oil 
production, from 900 Gbl in 2000 to 2,500 Gbl in 2050 (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Muddling Through, flows of world oil production (left), stocks of 






































Conventional Oil Reserves - World
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
This is indeed a level that corresponds to the middle of the range of total 
Ultimate Recoverable Resources estimates for conventional liquids as 
identified by the Institut Français du Pétrole (Figure 4). Furthermore, it 
supposes about 3,500 Gbl of total cumulative discoveries in order to 
maintain a minimum level of reserves.  








































2Figure 4: Estimates of conventional oil Ultimate Recoverable Resources (source 
P.R. Bauquis, 2006) 
Source: IFP/DSEP adapted from Martin (1985) and Campbell (1992) - Updated 2000
* Cumulative production + proven reserves +






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































* Cumulative production + proven reserves +























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The consistency of the long run oil projections of the POLES model with 
the taking into account of resource limits is made possible by the expected 
increase of recoverable resources through significantly enhanced recovery 
rates in the different production regions. Nevertheless, the implied 
hypotheses for oil production in the Gulf region seems to be extremely 
optimistic as it supposes more than a doubling in 2030 and beyond. This 
increase in Gulf oil production to more than 40 Mbd from 2030 to 2050 is 
probably questionable, not only from the resource and production capacity 
perspective, but also for reasons related to the geopolitical and internal 
political dimensions of the oil industry development in this region. This is 
why the smooth path for oil price increases that is associated with this 
scenario can be considered as a relatively optimistic hypothesis, although 
it ends at more than 100 €/bl in 2050, structurally (Figure 5). 



















































































International Prices - MT
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
The second reason for which the Muddling Through is probably not 
sustainable results from the implied CO2 emission level for the energy 
sector (Figure 6). 





















































Total GHG Emissions by region - MT
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
Emissions indeed double over the period considered, which would place 
this scenario in the very high range of the IPCC scenarios: a type VI 
scenario in the Table SPM.5 of AR4 (see above Table 1), i.e. a mean 
temperature increase at equilibrium between 5 and 6°C. 








































2Table 1: IPCC-AR4 Stabilization scenarios 
 
 
Source: IPCC, AR4, SPM 
2.  Alternative Climate Policy Scenarios and Their Impacts on 
the International Energy Markets  
Three scenarios are used in the this study in order to characterize 
contrasted states of the world from the perspective of the “energy security 
and climate policy” nexus. They allow in particular the illustration of the 
consequences of differentiated energy policies on the fundamentals of the 
world energy system. 
2.1.  Alternative Scenario Definition 
The Muddling Through with Europe Plus (MT E+) scenario supposes a 
failure in the efforts to develop a common framework of targets, rules and 
mechanisms for climate policies. Only weak domestic climate policies are 
implemented without any strong element of coordination of the different 
actions. But the case supposes that Europe goes beyond the mere 
Muddling Through policy, with a carbon value that is significantly rising 
from 8 €/tCO2 in 2010 to 89 €/tCO2 in 2050, instead of only 40 €/tCO2 in 








































2MT. The resulting picture is one of lower emissions in Europe than in the 
Muddling Through, but world emissions in 2050 are still above 51percent 
compared to 2000, which still corresponds to a Type IV scenario in the 
AR4 typology (see Table 2). 
The third scenario, Europe Alone, supposes that Europe goes alone with a 
really stringent climate policy line, while the rest of the world continues on 
the same line as in Muddling Through. In that case it is supposed that the 
carbon value in the rest of the world is unchanged, while it is set in Europe 
at 178 €/tCO2 in 2050 (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Scenarios for Exploring the Energy Security – Climate Policy Nexus 






with 2 Markets : 





EU : 8 in 2010   
40 in 2050
EU : 8 in 2010    
178 in 2050
Ann 1 : 16 in 2010  
392 in 2050
World :7 in 2010 
380 in 2050
RoW : 10 years 
lag / EU
RoW : as in 
Muddling 
Through
Non Ann 1 :       
1 in 2010          
257 in 2050
EU27 CO2 emissions :    
2020 / 1990              
2050 / 1990
              
-4%           
-21%
               
-20%           
-60%
Annex 1 CO2 emissions:  
2020 / 1990              
2050 / 1990
                 
-25% /year 2000    
-80% /year 2000
World CO2 emissions :   
2020 / 1990              
2050 / 1990
              
+ 67%         
+ 72%
              
+63%          
+ 59%
                 
127% /year 2000    
- 50% /year 2000   
               
127% /year 2000 
- 50% /year 2000 
AR4 Scenario Profile
Type IV        
> 600 CO2e    
Type IV         
> 600 CO2e     
Type II            
> 500 CO2e      
Type II          
> 500 CO2e      
  Source: SECURE project 
Finally, the Global Regime scenarios correspond to the stabilization 
profile of GHG concentrations, below 450 ppmv for CO2 and 500 ppmv for 
all GHG gases. This is simulated through a world emission profile that 
ends up in 2050 at 50 percent of 2000 CO2 emissions. This is the Factor 2 
reduction in 2050 emissions at world level, which is often advocated in 
international negotiations by the proponents of strong climate policies. In 
compliance with this global profile, two variants have been considered. In 








































2the Global Regime Two Markets (GR-2M) variant, the reductions in Annex 
I countries are set at -25 percent in 2020 and -  80 percent in 2050, 
compared to 2000. Reductions in the non-Annex I countries are 
determined as the residual for the global Factor 2 reduction. It 
corresponds to a case in which Annex 1 countries adopt a strong target 
and leave room for some emission increases in Non Annex 1 regions, as 
they do not use flexibility mechanisms to comply with this target. In the 
Global Regime Full Trade (GR-FT) variant, the same world emission 
profile is simulated while considering one world carbon price that is 
obtained either by a unified world carbon tax or by a global market for 
carbon emission trading.  
2.2.  Scenario Results 
As the Muddling Through with Europe Plus scenario is an intermediate 
case aimed at covering the range of policies between Muddling Through 
and  Europe Alone, we will leave this case aside and only provide a 
description of the consequences of the two most contrasted emission 
reduction scenarios, i.e. Europe Alone and Global Regime.  
2.2.1.  Europe Alone (EA) 
This scenario aims at studying the impacts on the energy system of a 
strong climate policy in Europe, in spite a non-cooperative international 
framework with climate policies in the rest of the world that still correspond 
to the Muddling Through framework. In this setting, the carbon value at the 
end of the period is six times higher in Europe than in the rest of the world 
(Figure 7). 






























































Rest of the world


























International Prices - EA
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
  In this scenario, world gross inland consumption and international 
energy prices are hardly impacted compared to the preceding scenario, as 
Europe only represents a limited and diminishing fraction of the world 
energy system, i.e. 9 percent of total GIEC in 2050. 
Figure 8: Europe Gross Inland Energy Consumption and CO2 emissions in Europe 
Alone 








































EU27 - Total and CO2 emissions - EA 
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
  Conversely, in this scenario, the European energy system is 
profoundly altered by the introduction of a significant carbon value. Total 
energy consumption remains quite stable during the period. But the fuel-
mix in total supply is quite different: fossil energy sources, which represent 
in 2000 79 percent of total GIEC are reduced to 71percent in 2020 and to 








































246 percent in 2050. The electricity system also incurs radical changes and 
is a major contributor to the reductions of carbon emissions in Europe 
(Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Europe electricity generation mix and role of Carbon Capture and Storage 
in Europe Alone 
































EU27 Electricity Production with and w/o Sequestration - EA
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
  Electricity production increases all over the projection period from 
3,000 TWh in 2000 to 5,200 in 2050. This indicates that the electrification 
of the energy balance is one important dimension of emission abatement 
policies in the energy sector. This is easily explained by the following 
reasons: first, the penetration of non-CO2 power generation options allows 
reducing considerably the CO2 content of the average kWh; second, 
stimulated by the high carbon value, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
develops after 2020 and represents almost 47 percent of total thermal 
generation in 2050. This explains why electricity is almost carbon-free in 
Europe by the end of the projection period and why the role of the 
electricity sector is so prominent in emission abatement policies. 
2.2.2.  Global Climate Regime (GR) 
The main feature of this scenario is the introduction of a global cap on 
emissions. The Global Regime scenario reflects a state of the world with 








































2ambitious climate targets, aiming at an emission profile of Type II in the 
AR4 typology. Emissions indeed double over the period considered, which 
would place this scenario in the very high range of the IPCC scenarios: a 
type VI scenario in the Table SPM.5 of AR4 (see Table 1), i.e. a mean 
temperature increase at equilibrium between 5 and 6°C (see above 
Emissions indeed double over the period considered, which would place 
this scenario in the very high range of the IPCC scenarios: a type VI 
scenario in the Table SPM.5 of AR4 (see above Table 1), i.e. a mean 
temperature increase at equilibrium between 5 and 6°C. 
Table 1 ). It allows stabilizing concentrations below 450  CO2-only and 
500 CO2-equiv. and is indeed characterized by a 50 percent reduction in 
global emissions. 
In the variant Global Regime with Two Markets (GR-TM), Annex  1 
countries reduce their emissions by 25 percent in 2020 and 80 percent in 
2050. These reductions are triggered by a rapidly increasing carbon value, 
which increases from 16 €/tCO2 in 2010 to 68 €/tCO2 in 2020 and to 
392  €/tCO2 in 2050. The corresponding carbon value in non-Annex 1 
countries is significantly lower at 10  €/tCO2 in 2020 and 257€/tCO2 in 
2050. 
  In the second variant, Global Regime with Full Trade (GR-FT), it is 
supposed that the abatement program follows the principle of the 
equalization of Marginal Abatement costs, as would result fromthe 
introduction of a unique carbon value, through a global carbon market or a 
unified international carbon tax. In this framework of hypotheses, the 
resulting carbon value increases rapidly to 28 €/tCO2 in 2020, 73 in 2030, 








































2178 in 2040 and 383 in 2050. One can emphasize the fact that the carbon 
value that is necessary to induce radically new trajectories in the world 
and European energy system is one order of magnitude higher than the 
value used in the Muddling Through, low intensity policy case. This 
corresponds to the fact that the Global Regime scenario reveals the need 
for radical changes in the energy systems: indeed 400 €/tCO2 correspond 
approximately to one additional euro per litre of gasoline in typical 
European conditions. 
Figure 10: Carbon Value meeting the emission cap and endogenous international 




















Rest of the world
























International Prices - GR-FT 
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
  While the European Gross Inland Energy Consumption and fuel-mix 
are not significantly different from the one simulated in Europe Alone (as 
presented in Figure 8), major changes occur in the global energy picture. 
World energy consumption is reduced by about one fourth compared to 
the one projected in the Muddling Through. As a result, the total amount of 
fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) that is consumed at world level in 2050 is 8 
percent lower than the one of 2000 (Figure 11). Due to its relatively low 
carbon content, natural gas consumption in 2050 is still higher than in 
2000, but coal and oil consumption are lower. 








































2Figure 11: World Gross Inland Consumption and CO2 emissions by sector in the 











































Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
In order to reduce global emissions by 50 percent, this scenario supposes 
a significant development of Carbon Capture and Storage. By 2050, 
almost 44 percent of total gross emissions are captured, with almost 90 
percent of CCS occurring in the electricity sector and the rest in industry 
and hydrogen production. 
  As a consequence of the low levels of consumption for the different 
fossil fuels in 2050 relatively to 2000, the prices of fossil fuels can be 
expected to be much lower in this scenario than in the Muddling Through 
or even Europe Alone scenarios. Indeed, the endogenous price 
mechanisms in the model result in a stabilization of international energy 
prices, at a level that is only 10 to 20 percent superior to current level, all 
along the projection period. 
This leads to the main intermediate conclusion at this stage: climate 
policies, if they are ambitious and effective, will have a significant impact 
on the demand/supply balance for fossil fuels at the international level. In 
turn, this new balance of the global energy economy will certainly have 
significant impact on the range and variations in the international prices of 








































23.  Impacts on International Energy Trade and on Europe’s 
Energy Security 
In this section, we first analyze the consequences of the different 
scenarios in the perspective of Europe’s dependence upon the 
international markets and consider the corresponding value of energy 
imports. In the second stage, we focus on natural gas imports and analyze 
the profile and sources of these imports in a geopolitical perspective. 
3.1.  World Oil Supply and Trade  
The profile of oil production is an important feature of any long-term 
energy scenario. Because it is easy to transport, store and use, oil has 
been for many decades the “swing energy source” for balancing energy 
supply and demand. For that reason, the price of oil often serves as a 
reference price for other energy sources. As discussed above, the 
Muddling Through projection suggests that this balancing role may 
become more problematic in the future, due to increasing difficulties in 
balancing oil demand and supply. According to the POLES simulations, 
the world has emerged from a 20-year period of relatively cheap and 
abundant oil that began after the 1986 counter-shock. In the view of many 
observers and more recently also of insiders of the oil industry, the oil 








































2market in the next decade may undergo successive waves of structural 
changes that can be summarized as follows: 
In the short-term, the international market dynamics will be much 
influenced by the lack of surplus production capacity and by the peak in 
production in non-OPEC countries (a phenomenon that has been delayed 
in the past decade by production increases in the CIS). 
In the medium-term, the critical concern will be the extension of OPEC’s 
countries production capacities well beyond their historic maximum (i.e. 
35 Mbd in 2008). 
In the long-term, the peak in OPEC and Gulf production may constrain the 
global consumption of oil, even if non-conventional oil is strongly 
developed (as it is already in the Muddling Through case). 
  This vision of the future of world oil is indeed consistent with a close 
analysis of recent trends in world oil production that clearly shows the 
levelling-off of oil production in non-OPEC non-CIS regions (Figure 12) 





































                     Source: BP Statistical Review 2010 
The conventional and non-conventional oil production profiles in the 
Muddling Through scenario, as illustrated in the top row of Figure 13, 








































2  Non-OPEC production was still increasing before 2010 due to new 
capacities in the CIS (notably in Kazakhstan); between 2010 and 
2020 it is stabilized at 48 Mbd but after that date it begins to decline 
to only 30 Mbd in 2050. 
 As demand increase remains strong in the next decades, 
particularly in the emerging economies, the balance of supply and 
demand implies that production in both the Gulf and the rest of 
OPEC doubles from now to 2040 and then stabilizes until 2050. 
  Similarly, the production of non-conventional oil, mostly from extra-
heavy oil, tar sands and by the end of the projection also oil shales, 
becomes competitive and provides more than one tenth of total 
production in 2050. 
  As a combination of these different trends, the production of 
conventional oil peaks at 95 Mbd in 2030, while non conventional 
oil represents at that date 6 Mbd. After 2030, conventional 
production progressively decreases to 83 Mbd in 2050, but part of 
the retreat in conventional oil is compensated by an increase in non 
conventional production to about 11 Mbd. 
  The global oil production profile thus resembles the so-called oil 
plateau anticipated by many observers of the oil scene, with a 
maximum production after 2030 at 101  Mbd and then a slow 
decline to about 94 Mbd in 2050. 








































2The world oil production profile is hardly affected by the introduction of a 
strong carbon constraint in the Europe Alone case (see Figure 13, middle 
row). Conventional oil production levels off between 2020 and 2030, while 
non conventional oil production is about 10 percent lower in 2050 than in 
the Muddling Through case. 
The situation is, of course, very different in the Global Regime where 
conventional oil tops in 2020 with a strong decline after that date, while 
non-conventional oil hardly increases over the projection period (see 
Figure 13 bottom row). This is clearly the result of a “peak demand” 
introduced by strong carbon constraints in all world regions. High fossil 
fuel prices at consumer level are very high in that case due to the price of 
carbon, and oil demand is significantly reduced by the development of 
high efficiency and low emission options in transport (electric and 
hydrogen vehicles). 
Figure 13: Main producers of conventional oil (left) and non-conventional oil (right) 


















































































































































Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
 
    The increase in oil energy consumption upto 2050 appears to 
be limited even in the Muddling Through case. However, due to the 
general decline in non-OPEC production the international trade in oil 
increases from about 1.5 Gtoe today to more than 2.3 Gtoe in 2030 and 
2040 (see Figure 14, where flows are measured between the main world 
regions). This is partly the consequence of the increase in consumption, 
but also of the concentration of production in the OPEC countries and 
more particularly the Gulf. In 2050, four regions are net exporters of oil, 
with the Middle East representing three-fourth of total exports. The other 








































2exporting regions are the CIS, Latin America and Africa. One can note the 
reduced imports of North America, which are due to the large supply of 
non-conventional oil from Canada. Again the world situation is hardly 
affected in the Europe Alone case. 
    Finally, the consequences of the Global Regime can be 
synthesized as follows: while oil exports of the four structurally exporting 
regions are doubled in 2030 compared to 2000, the situation in 2050 is, to 
a large extent, a return to the 2000 situation, with almost unchanged 
market shares and a maintained dominance of the Middle East in total 
exports.  
Figure 14: International oil trade 









































































Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 








































23.2.  World Gas Supply, Trade and European Imports 
One of the key concerns regarding the long-term energy security of 
Europe is its dependence in terms of gas supply. Natural gas is a key 
resource, with new perspectives introduced by non-conventional shale 
gas. Its environmental characteristics are rather favorable, including in the 
context of GHG abatement policies, as gas-based electricity has a CO2 
content that is on average half of that of coal-based electricity (when no-
capture and storage option is considered). Natural gas also brings 
flexibility and diversification of energy supply at the transformation or end-
use level. 
One of the key issues with natural gas supply is that of the transport 
infrastructure that is highly investment intensive whether in the form of gas 
pipelines or in terms of LNG facilities at exporting or importing points. The 
POLES model allows the description, with a relatively high level of detail, 
of the conditions of supply of the different regions of the world. It takes into 
account the key variables that explain the development of gas transport 
infrastructure, with an explicit description of the main routes and of their 
costs. These routes are developed endogenously, as a function of each 
region’s demand, supply and gas market price, of the state of the reserves 
of the suppliers and of the transports costs, pipelines or LNG chains. 








































2Figure 15: Principal Producers of Natural Gas in the Four Scenarios  


















































































Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
In the Muddling Through case, contrary to the oil situation, there is no 
peak gas before 2050, and by that date world gas production is about 
twice that of 2000, with 4.8 Bcm (see Figure 15). The Gulf and CIS regions 
will account for an increasing share of world production in the future, as 
European and North American production decreases in absolute terms. In 
particular, gas production in the Gulf region increases from 0.4 Bcm in 
2010 to 1.9 Bcm in 2050. Again, the Europe Alone case does not 
introduce noticeable changes at the world level. Only in the Global Regime 
case is world gas production significantly impacted. However, there is still 
in that case, a significant increase in world gas production, from 3 Bcm in 








































22010 to 4 Bcm in 2050. The Gulf region and CIS are the main suppliers, 
with 35 percent each of world gas production. 
Inter-regional trade in gas increases considerably in the Muddling Through 
scenario as shown in Figure 16, from 0.2 Gtoe today to 1.5 Gtoe in 2050. 
These figures exclude intra-regional trade. The Middle East and the CIS 
are by far the largest exporters in 2050. The principal importing regions in 
2050 are Asia, Europe and, to a lesser extent, North America; Africa is 
self-sufficient for its gas supply. The decrease of gas demand in other 
scenarios is accompanied by reduction of the imports to 1 Gtoe in 2050 in 
Global Regime. 
Figure 16: International gas trade 



















































    


































































2Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
The simulation of different conditions of international energy markets and 
European energy system in the POLES scenarios allows the display of 
very different profiles for Europe’s future natural gas supply (Figure 17). In 
the Muddling Through scenario, Western Europe’s total gas imports (i.e. 
gas consumption minus supplies from UK, Netherlands and Norway) are 
expected to increase dramatically over the next decades, from 200 Bcm to 
650 Bcm in 2050. This happens, in spite of a total demand that is levelling 
off at about 700 Bcm between 2030 and 2040, but this is due to the 
reduction in regional domestic production from Norway, UK and 
Netherlands, which are divided by a factor of almost four between 2000 
and 2050, from 240 to 50 Bcm. While supply from Russia increases from 
130 Bcm to 219-226 Bcm in these two scenarios, European gas supply 
also increasingly depends on new supplies from Nigeria, the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (mostly Kazakhstan), and Iran. 








































2Figure 17: Europe’s Natural Gas Supplies in the Four Scenarios 














































European gas imports by country EA
   























European gas imports by country -G R-FT
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
  








































2The picture is quite different in the Europe Alone and Global Regime 
cases: due to the carbon constraint, total gas demand of Western Europe 
is much lower after 2020 than in the two preceding cases. In 2050, it is 
even lower than in 2000 with about 400 Bcm in Global Regime scenario. 
To a large extent, this reduction of total demand weighs on the new 
suppliers that would play an important role in the Muddling Through 
scenario, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Kazakhstan and Iran. 
Imports from Russia still represent about 200 Bcm in 2050 in both 
scenarios. 
In conclusion of this analysis of long-term natural gas supply of Europe, 
one has indeed to emphasize the fact that the volume of Russian exports 
to Europe appear to be relatively stable in the different scenarios, at least 
until 2040, when they reach a level of about 200 Bcm in the four cases. 
Only after that date do the results differ significantly, with exports that are 
30 to 40 percent higher in the Muddling Through than in the Europe Alone 
and  Global Regime scenarios.  Russia seems, however, to keep a 
comparative advantage in the supply of Europe in the carbon constraint 
cases. 
3.3.  World Coal Supply and Trade 
In spite of resources that are more widely distributed than those of oil and 
gas, international coal trade doubles over the projection period in the 
Muddling Through (Figure 18) scenario. The high volume of trade reflects 
the strong comeback of coal in a double context of relative scarcity and 
high prices of oil and gas, accompanied by only moderate GHG emission 
constraints. The situation changes in the Europe Alone and Global 








































2Regime scenarios. Coal trade remains almost stable during the period in 
the Europe Alone scenario and it even decreases compared to current 
levels in the Global Regime scenario.  
Europe remains the major importer, representing more than 80 percent of 
net imports during the whole period in all scenarios except in the Europe 
Alone case, in which other world regions continue to intensively use coal. 
However, European coal imports shrink from the Muddling Through 
scenario to the others, due to changes in the structure of the electricity 
generation and final consumption in favor of decarbonised energies and 
cleaner technologies. 
Figure 18: International Coal Trade 























































   





































































Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
 
The four main exporting regions are North America, the Pacific, Africa and 
the CIS. Because of the rapid growth in consumption, Asia becomes a net 
importer late in the period. Their share remains nearly stable, while the 
volume diminishes in the Europe Alone and Global Regime scenarios. 
3.4.  Consequences for Europe’s Energy Dependence and Value of 
Imports 
The scenarios presented above result in very different profiles for energy 
imports and dependence. The Muddling Through corresponds to the 
scenario with higher consumption, imports, dependence rate and value of 
energy imports. While Europe’s global import dependence rate was of 50 
percent in 2005 and the value of energy imports of 236 G€ in 2005, these 
figures rise respectively to 57 percent and 351 G€ in 2020 and 53 percent 
and 491 G€ in 2050 (Table 3, upper row).  








































2Table 3: Profiles for Europe Energy Imports and Dependence in Three Contrasted 
Scenarios 
Muddling through 
MT Results - EU27 1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
GIC (Mtoe) 1531 1725 1822 1759 1820 1911 1909 1881
Imports (Mtoe)  Coal, lignite -72 -94 -107 -95 -96 -132 -144 -146
 Oil -464 -505 -557 -532 -543 -537 -475 -399
 Natural gas -112 -180 -250 -298 -399 -471 -473 -448
Dependance rate  Coal, lignite 17% 30% 35% 32% 35% 44% 48% 50%
 Oil 79% 76% 82% 81% 83% 86% 86% 85%
 Natural gas 45% 46% 56% 69% 83% 91% 94% 96%
Total 42% 45% 50% 53% 57% 60% 57% 53%
International prices (€05/boe) Coal 11.8 7.2 10.9 11.8 12.8 13.6 14.5 15.4
O i l 2 4 . 92 5 . 94 4 . 25 1 . 96 0 . 57 2 . 28 5 . 29 9
G a s 1 4 . 01 8 . 32 5 . 83 2 . 23 4 . 73 8 . 84 6 . 15 5
Value of imports (G€05)  Coal, lignite 6.2 4.9 8.6 8.2 9.0 13.2 15.3 16.4
 Oil 84.5 96.1 180.4 202.7 240.7 284.4 296.6 291.3
 Natural gas 11.5 24.1 47.3 70.3 101.5 133.8 160.1 183.1






EA Results - EU27 1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
GIC (Mtoe) 1531 1725 1822 1740 1705 1756 1738 1700
Imports (Mtoe)  Coal, lignite -72 -94 -107 -86 -46 -55 -59 -60
 Oil -464 -505 -557 -522 -490 -440 -344 -255
 Natural gas -112 -180 -250 -295 -366 -373 -324 -295
Dependance rate  Coal, lignite 17% 30% 35% 31% 27% 34% 38% 42%
 Oil 79% 76% 82% 81% 82% 84% 82% 79%
 Natural gas 45% 46% 56% 69% 82% 88% 91% 94%
Total 42% 45% 50% 52% 53% 49% 42% 36%
International prices (€05/boe) Coal 11.8 7.2 10.9 11.7 12.7 13.4 14.3 15.2
O i l 2 4 . 92 5 . 94 4 . 25 1 . 05 9 . 77 0 . 18 2 . 19 4
G a s 1 4 . 01 8 . 32 5 . 83 1 . 83 5 . 13 8 . 14 4 . 25 3
Value of imports (G€05)  Coal, lignite 6.2 4.9 8.6 7.3 4.2 5.4 6.2 6.7
 Oil 84.5 96.1 180.4 195.4 214.5 226.0 206.9 177.1
 Natural gas 11.5 24.1 47.3 68.8 94.2 104.1 105.1 115.7






GR-FT Results - EU27 1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
GIC (Mtoe) 1531 1725 1822 1747 1801 1841 1781 1698
Imports (Mtoe)  Coal, lignite -72 -94 -107 -91 -73 -73 -73 -68
 Oil -464 -505 -557 -525 -527 -475 -357 -233
 Natural gas -112 -180 -250 -293 -397 -407 -341 -271
Dependance rate  Coal, lignite 17% 30% 35% 32% 33% 39% 42% 44%
 Oil 79% 76% 82% 81% 83% 86% 86% 84%
 Natural gas 45% 46% 56% 69% 83% 90% 93% 97%
Total 42% 45% 50% 52% 55% 52% 43% 34%
International prices (€05/boe) Coal 11.8 10.9 11.6 12.2 12.9 13.9 14.8 14.8
Oil 24.9 44.2 51.1 57.9 61.9 59.1 46.4 44.6
Gas 14.0 25.8 31.9 33.8 33.8 33.0 29.8 30.1
Value of imports (G€05)  Coal, lignite 6.2 7.5 9.2 8.1 7.0 7.5 8.0 7.3
 Oil 84.5 163.5 208.7 222.7 239.1 205.9 121.6 76.3
 N a t u r a l  g a s 1 1 . 53 4 . 05 8 . 57 2 . 69 8 . 59 8 . 67 4 . 45 9
Total 102.3 205.0 276.4 303.4 344.6 312.0 203.9 143.5
. 9
 
Source: POLES model, LEPII, SECURE project 
The Europe Alone scenario presents interesting characteristics, as it is the 
one with the lowest level of energy imports in terms of volume and 
dependence rate. This can be easily explained as this case combines a 
stringent emission reduction policy in Europe, while the rest of the world 
continues along a line of modest climate policy. In that case, the global 
demand and prices for fossil fuels remain high and this not only limits 








































2demand in Europe but also stimulates domestic supply. The value of total 
energy imports is more than halved in the Europe Alone scenario in 2050, 
compared to the Muddling Through. One key outcome of the study is thus 
that a strong European climate policy may create a double dividend in 
terms of energy security, even in the case of weak global climate 
coordination. 
Finally, the Global Regime scenario illustrates a fully different future for the 
world energy system, with lower global fossil fuel demand and prices. 
Europe’s energy imports are similar in quantities compared to the Europe 
Alone case described above. But oil and gas prices are significantly lower 
and, as a consequence, the value of imports is at its lowest level: 144 G€ 
only in 2050, against 491 G€ in the Muddling Through scenario. 
4.  Conclusion 
This scenario exercise, allows the illustration of the complex interactions of 
climate policies and energy security issues. They show in particular that 
the Muddling Through scenario, with low intensity and non-coordinated 
climate policy does not represent a really sustainable energy future. This 
is because of the double constraint that impends on the world energy 
system: upstream through the limitations in oil and gas availability and 
downstream, by the limited storage capacity of the atmosphere for GHGs. 
The low carbon price does already change significantly the level of 
emissions through reduced demand, accelerated development of non-
fossil energy sources and some development of Carbon Capture and 
Storage. But this is not sufficient to meet the emission targets that are 








































2considered as desirable in IPCC AR2 in order to limit average temperature 
increase at level of 2°C compared to the pre-industrial situation. Moreover, 
this scenario neither significantly alters the balance of demand or supply 
on the international energy markets, although it alleviates somewhat the 
potential tensions. 
 The  Global Regime scenario clearly allows the improvement of the 
situation from these two perspectives, of reducing both emissions and the 
level of tension on international hydrocarbon markets, through lower oil 
and gas production. This is a potential double dividend situation, probably 
the most important one to be derived from ambitious climate policies. 
Finally, the Europe Alone scenario does not meet the climate target as the 
impacts of ambitious policies in Europe are not sufficient to compensate 
for the massive global emission increases in the rest of the world. 
However, in this scenario setting, there is still an element that is strongly 
beneficial for Europe: 
1. Imposing strong emission reduction domestically results in a 
thorough restructuring of the European energy system. 
2. While it is supposed in this scenario that other countries adopt a 
free-riding behaviour and do not trigger such a restructuring, it is 
probable that tensions on the oil and gas market would remain high, 
with risks of repeated shocks in the near- and long-term future. 
3.  In that case, Europe would be protected from these external shocks 
by lower energy demand, higher contribution of domestic non-fossil 
fuels (renewable and nuclear), and a much lower level of fossil fuel 
imports. 








































2Would this reward of ambitious climate policies fully compensate for the 
extra costs of the energy system restructuring? This question remains 
open today. Table 4 intends to illustrate the fundamentals of the risks 
associated for a country (c) to a negative event (e) and develops the risks 
in the three archetypal scenarios examined in this study.  
Table 4: Risk as the Vulnerability to an Adverse Event  
 




Europe Alone High High Low
Global Regime Low Low Low
 
It comes out of this study that an ambitious policy would bring to Europe a 
double dividend in its capacity to develop a new energy model  adjusted 
to sound climate policies  and in the resulting lower vulnerability to 
potential shocks on the international energy markets. Hence, it appears 
that it would probably be in the interest of Europe to implement the 
ambitious policy that is part of the Climate and Energy Package of 2008. 
Of course, this raises the issue of how to develop cooperative relations 
with oil- and gas-exporting countries, who on their part may wish to benefit 
from a certain degree of security of demand. Exchanges and discussions 
on long-term energy scenarios  however fragile and uncertain these 
scenarios remain  may help in an improved mutual understanding of the 
goals that are pursued by both categories of countries in the development 
of their energy policies. In that way, scenarios can be useful tools to 
develop a somewhat stabilized framework for the investment decisions 








































2that in any case will be necessary to ensure the long-term energy supply 
of the different world regions. 
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